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Abstract 
The free market economy, to which East European countries are increasingly being exposed, 
implies that classical budgeting techniques in the form of the Faustmann approach present 
themselves as the tools of choice for forest investment analysis. One implication is that the 
choice of a proper discount rate (r) must be made as part of the basis for formulating a harvest 
policy. The paper discusses this choice in the light of practice as well as theory, and, using 
Lithuania as a case, examines the potential economic and political impact of softening the 
current restrictions on forest management. 
 
A review of the debate on discounting in forestry is provided. A statistical analysis of the 
relation between reported rs  and internal rates of return (IRR) from numerous studies on 
forestry investments reveals a strong correlation between r and IRR. Possible explanations are 
provided. Analysis reveals that application of any positive r will significantly change forestry 
practice in Lithuania. Setting r = 3 per cent, slow growing species are to be replaced by fast 
growing species, and rotation periods should be substantially shortened. The standing volume of 
(over-) mature forests is about 160 million m
3, as compared with the currently harvestable 
volume of about 40 million m
3  according to the minimum allowable rotation age. The 
macroeconomic perspectives of cashing some of the mature forest for the small transition 
economy are discussed, taking into account the effects of externalities of forests. Consequently 
we suggest an alternative formulation of the normal forest. 
 
Finally, based on these considerations, a real r of 0-2 per cent is suggested for State forestry in 
Lithuania. A post-tax r of 2 per cent is advocated for private forestry, with potential project 
specific deviations downward to 0 or upward to 4 per cent. It is stressed that discount rate is 
viewed as one of important decision parameters and due regard should be given to non-timber 
forest outputs, social and institutional settings and other factors.  
 
Keywords: transition economy, Lithuanian forestry, economic analysis, discounting.    
1. Introduction 
 
Since the Faustmann formula became widely recognised, the discount rate (r) has been 
an important variable in forest investment analysis. Soil expectation value (SEV) is the 
basic criterion for optimising silvicultural regimes, sequential choice of management 
units for various silvicultural activities, joint optimisation of timber and non-timber 
outputs, etc. Forest investment analysis continues to be based on the Faustmann 
formula, though often in modified forms which account for risk, uncertainty, and 
externalities, and allow more flexible treatment of various parameters in different time 
periods, e.g. Chang (1998). There is an enormous number of studies demonstrating the 
high dependency of silvicultural decisions on the r. However, few studies discuss which 
r is the most appropriate, and the rate used often differs from one study to another even 
if the economic conditions are similar.  
This creates confusion among forestry scientists and practitioners in East European 
countries where forestry research experiences a swift shift in its content and objectives, 
especially as regards forest economics. Traditionally, forest science and silviculture 
have focused on biological aspects, while economic objectives were expressed 
indirectly, e.g. maximising the volume of certain timber assortments (so-called technical 
maturity) when deciding on optimal rotation ages. Financial criteria such as net present 
value or forest rent were not used in the central planning economies. 
Transition to the market economy implies that forest investment analysis becomes part 
of decision making in the State and especially in private forestry. Forest economics 
based on Faustmann-like principles suggests itself as the common tool of practice and 
progresses to an important subject within the forestry curriculum in East European 
countries. Yet the choice of discount rate remains an unexplored issue. Estimation of a 
suitable discount rate is not a trivial task when the experience of decision making under 
market economy conditions is absent. The matter is further complicated as the 
importance of non-timber forest benefits gradually increases. Relying on the experience 
of countries with long forestry tradition under market economy and on the socio-
economic and environmental aspects of forestry in transition economies, this paper aims 
at analysing the effects of the discount rate with focus on appropriate use of modern 
economic methods in Baltic countries, with Lithuania as a case. 
2. Learning from experience 
 2.1 A review of theoretical arguments 
While the choice of r is a new topic for East European forestry, it has for decades been 
an issue of fierce debates in economic literature. A brief review of some frequently used 
arguments is worthwhile before analysing the effect of a particular r.  
Three notable groups can be separated: Advocates of the forest rent school, the soil rent 
or opportunity cost advocates, and a large group trying to find a steady ground for some 
compromise between the recommendations of the two other schools. 
The origins of the ‘forest rent’ school are found in classical German forestry. The 
concept of time preference hardly had any relevance in developing the theory of the 
normal forest. Defenders of forest rent reject the idea of discounting in forestry. No time 
preference is assumed and simply the average annual cash flow is maximised. Various    
arguments have been raised against discounting, such as ethical indefensibility (Ramsey 
1928), depletion of natural resources (Clark 1973), and intergenerational equity 
(Hampicke 1991). 
In theory, if not always in practice, the forest rent criterion was substituted by the soil 
rent criterion in many countries. Within the soil rent school, the opportunity cost of 
capital has been favoured as a criterion for ensuring efficient allocation of resources in 
forestry, e.g. Row et al. (1981). Some forest economists obtain lower than conventional 
discount rates, while still using the traditional opportunity cost of capital criterion. 
Holten-Andersen (1990) presents analyses of the Danish bond market for the period 
1819 to 1987. Taking into account the Danish income taxation system it is concluded 
that the long-term real interest rate lies in the range from 2 to 4 per cent on pre-tax basis 
and from 0 to 3 per cent on post-tax basis. Analyses of returns on corporate bonds in the 
USA (1960-1978) led Row et al. (1981) to recommend a 4 per cent r to be used in 
investment analysis in the US Forest Service. Such rate well explains the behaviour of 
forest investors in the Pacific Northwest region of the USA, but it fails for Southern 
USA where rotation ages of 25-35 years for loblolly pine suggest that rates of 7 to 8 per 
cent are used (J.D. Brodie, pers. com., 1999). Opportunity cost of capital should not be 
that different between various regions of the USA. Some prominent economists contend 
that in long-term physical investments such as forestry the r should be high due to the 
related risks and uncertainties (Samuelson 1976) and the loss of liquidity (Kronrad and 
de Steiguer 1983).  
Changing environmental attitudes, and the imposed image of barely profitable forestry 
venture, probably were the most important forces inducing the influential group of 
compromise seekers. Justification of special, low discount rates for forestry has been 
fastened with new arguments, in addition to those employed by advocates of forest rent. 
For example, Leslie (1989) insists that there is no empirical evidence of using high, 
industrially competitive interest rates in forestry and that such rates favour forest 
plantations instead of natural forest management practices. However, there is no clear 
answer to the question of how the desired low rates of 2 to 4 per cent should be obtained 
to reduce the revealed subjectivity of the choice. Controversial arguments were raised 
for justifying the social r that became a substitute for the conventional r in 
socioeconomics of natural resources. Social time preference rate and social opportunity 
cost have both been advocated as appropriate criteria for determining r. Pearce and 
Turner (1990) support the neo-classical view that the social time preference rate should 
be higher than the pure time preference rate of interest, “since future societies are likely 
to be richer than current ones” (p. 213). Argumentation for the social opportunity cost 
tends to place the social r within “Faustmann ranges”, as it resembles the desire for the 
efficient allocation of resources. Yet, many economists in natural resource management 
and in forestry specifically argue contrariwise: The social r should be lower than the 
private r due to market imperfection and presence of externalities.  
Harou (1984) suggests that previous experience of social r or presentation of net present 
values at different rs to decision makers, can help for determining the social discount 
rate. The upper and lower bounds might be obtained using the average of resulting 
internal rates of return (IRRs) and the average of used rs, respectively. Furthermore, the 
social opportunity cost is involved for correcting the resulting net present values to 
account for the displacement of private investments. Time has shown that neither 
Harou’s nor other methods for deriving the social r have found considerable application    
in practical forest investment analysis. This is not surprising, knowing the burden of 
required information combined with the fragility of assumptions (Price 1988).  
Zinkhan (1988) represents the group of economists adopting the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). He finds that required rates of return in forestry projects are lower due 
to the risk reduction benefits. This effect is obtained via negative correlation between 
returns from forest investments and the returns of an aggregate stock market index. 
While it may be argued that forest owners do not hold the market portfolio or any other 
highly diversified portfolio, it should still be stressed that in many cases a forest is itself 
a somewhat diversified portfolio. The use of several tree species and the production of 
different roundwood products, as well as non-wood products like hunting, can result in 
a considerable risk reduction.  
Thorsen (1999) analyses prices for spruce, oak and beech assortments in Denmark 
1912-1992. He finds that correlation between prices of roundwood from the different 
species is considerably less than 1, implying that reductions in risk may be obtained. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of variation of prices is significantly lower for high-grade 
products than for pulpwood products for all three species. This suggests a relatively 
lower r for forest stands producing high-grade products due to the reduction in the risk 
premium, but the amplitude of this reduction remains to be discussed. Klemperer et al. 
(1994) argue that risk premiums for forestry investments should be lower, as the long-
term nature of forest production implies unreasonably low certainty equivalents for 
expected values of forestry investments if the risk premium is fixed at a moderate level. 
Thus, taking risk into account will not necessarily increase discount rates in forestry 
above that observed in other economic sectors and may even, depending on the actual 
nature of the risk in the specific case, be considerably lower. 
Some authors yet argue for the use of risk free interest rates in investment analysis, as 
Price (1993) does in his comprehensive and challenging work on discounting. With the 
help of numerous examples, Price demonstrates flaws associated with traditional 
arguments - based on opportunity cost of capital and human time preference on 
consumption. Finally, the overall practice of conventional discounting is questioned, as 
“track of values through time is not generally a negative exponential” (p. 344). 
Although calling for caution, this assertion cannot help much in solving our problem: 
which r is appropriate for forest investment analysis in Eastern Europe. However, it is 
acknowledged that the r  is only one out of a group of parameters and criteria for 
decision making and the common effect of introducing an r may be blurred, e.g. due to 
restrictions in the form of sustainability in a technical and economic sense.  
Summarising the debate on discounting, the most commonly used arguments for a 
certain r are presented in Figure 1. It may be concluded that neither these arguments, 
nor the examples of discount rates applied in various countries and regions provide a 
straightforward answer to the question of choosing an r. 
    
 
Figure 1. Searching for the “best” discount rate in forestry. 
     Some examples
    Arguments      of practical
     (mis)achievements
Discount
rate r, %
10
Interests of future 
generations are 
equally significant as 
those of the present 
generation (Rawls 
1971).
Empirical evidence 
indicates r lying within 
the range of 2 to 4 % 
for temperate 
hardwoods (Leslie 
1989).
An appropriate risk 
premium in applied r 
may decline with 
increasing payoff 
period for  forest 
investments 
(Klemperer et al. 
1994).
Discounting is ethically 
indefensible and arises 
merely from weakness 
of the imagination 
(Ramsey 1928).
Opportunity costs of 
capital in the private 
economy is the most 
practical approach to 
determining society's 
time preference. 
(Row et al. 1981).
An r of 5% and below is 
economically 
unacceptable due to the 
long-term nature of 
forestry production and 
the related risks and 
uncertainties 
(Samuelson 1976)
Setting the social r below 
the private r is like 
charging different prices 
for the same commodity, 
thus creating the 
inefficiency of unequal 
marginal rates of return 
(Hirschleifer 1966).
Higher rates of return 
may be required on 
long-term physical 
investments, like those 
in forestry, to 
compensate for loss in 
liquidity
(Kronrad and de 
Steiguer 1983).
Social time preference rate reflects more than 
underlying level of impatience, since future societies 
are likely to be richer than the present (Pearce and 
Turner 1990).
USA, 4% <= r <= 8%:
different rates in various 
regions; a good example of 
"r little less than IRR" rule.
"Money makers" from Pinus 
radiata,  7% < r: 
no special worries about 
forestry investments; just 
compete with the industrial 
rates!
Germany, r = 0%:
proud of long rotations,
financially - disaster.
Scandinavian countries,
2% <= r <= 4%:
Economics of satisfycing; 
Policy: encouraging for 
longer rotations
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2.2 A review of practice 
Undoubtedly, the literature points to a number of important considerations to be made 
when deciding on discount rates. Consensus on a single specific recommendation is not 
achieved and we now turn from the theoretical arguments towards an evaluation of 
practice, as it reveals itself in numerous applied forest economic studies in the literature. 
The discount rates used in applied studies are as varying as one would expect, given the 
above disagreements on theoretical considerations. Reviewing the literature, we found 
that the use of a high r seems to coincide with cases where the IRR is high due to 
growth conditions and prices. To test the hypothesis that the applied r depends on the 
internal rate of return, various studies on forest investment analysis have been selected. 
The main criterion for the inclusion of a study in our analysis is a statement of IRR and 
an r. An average value of r and/or IRR is derived when several levels of r and/or IRR 
are presented in a study. The studies comprise a wide range of growing conditions, 
including low profitable Norwegian forests and high earning plantations in the tropics 
and the temperate areas of the Southern Hemisphere (sources indicated below Figure 2). 
Figure 2 summarises the estimated relation between the calculated IRRs and the used rs. 
There is an overwhelming evidence (two-sided p-value < 0.0001) that the slope term of 
the linear regression for the mean response of r to IRR is different from zero. The 95 per 
cent confidence interval: 0.286 to 0.649. When the studies were confined to projects 
yielding an IRR of less than 10 per cent, the r used was on average 19 per cent lower 
than the IRR (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2. Relationship between r and IRR in selected studies. Sources: 1 - Niskanen et al. 
1996; 2 - Braekke et al. 1994; 3 - Naurois and Buongiorno 1986; 4 - Holten-Andersen 1990; 5 – Hytönen 
and Aarnio 1998; 6 - Bailey 1986; 7 - Lea 1984; 8 - Willis and Garrod 1992; 9 - Kurtz et al. 1984; 10 - 
Tarrant et al. 1983; 11 - Nuronwu 1987; 12 - Tewari and Singh 1984; 13 - Niskanen et al. 1996; 14 - Tarp 
1994; 15 - Tewari and Singh 1984; 16 - Marothia 1988. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between r rate and IRR, when IRR < 10%. 
 
What does this evident association between the r and the IRR imply? At least two 
possible explanations present themselves. 
First, it may reflect the presence of substantial risk premiums in some forest production 
regimes. As discussed above, high discount rates are often used when evaluating fast 
growing tree species in monoculture plantations, kept in short rotations and aimed at the 
production of wood for pulp and paper. Such forest regimes do not benefit from the risk 
reductions related to the use of different species in the forest portfolio. Furthermore, 
these regimes aim at producing low-grade products where price variations are typically 
higher. For such risky investments to be undertaken, expected returns must be higher 
than for less risky forestry investments. This will result in higher (expected) IRR and 
the use of higher rs for project evaluation. However, it is doubtful that the differences in 
risk premium are as high as the variation of r, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
The second explanation does not comply with traditional arguments. Investors and 
analysts simply choose an r close to the IRR. The result is that net present values are in 
general positive, but never unreasonably high. This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that many authors refer to the chosen rs as those most frequently used in forestry 
practice, e.g. Braekke et al. (1994). Conclusively, growing conditions and prices, but 
not the opportunity cost of capital, are the decisive factors when choosing an r for use in 
forest investment analysis. The rationality of this approach is, however, doubtful. 
3. Impacts of discount rates - the Lithuanian case 
3.1 Economic estimations 
In this section we describe the potential impact on Lithuanian forests and economy of 
adopting different rs and the classical Faustmann approach to forest investment 
analysis. 
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Figure 4. Relationship between the SEV and the discount rate on the site of type 
oxalidosa. 
 
Using results from Brukas and Brodie (1999b), we present standard SEV calculations 
for different values of r. The timber growth models by Kuliešis (1993), pine assortment 
tables (Kenstavicius 1987), observed timber prices (CFME 1998), and actual costs of 
silvicultural activities served to calculate forest rent and SEVs for eight tree species on 
all site types. Real prices were assumed to remain constant and present regimes of 
intermediate stand treatments were taken as a basis for defining the timing and intensity 
of thinning. The obtained results are exemplified with SEVs on site type oxalidosa, 
which represents soils of normal humidity and moderate fertility (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 serves for finding the optimal choice of tree species as a result of the chosen r. 
Oak can compete with coniferous species only when the forest rent criterion is applied 
(estimated forest rent for oak, pine, and spruce is about $US 130 /ha/year). Pine and 
spruce yield superior SEVs when the r lies between 1 and 3 per cent. Between 3 and 4 
per cent, birch starts outpacing conifers and earns positive returns, until the r reaches the 
IRR at 5.6 per cent. Such IRR for Lithuanian conditions is achieved only on few sites 
where birch has the highest productivity. On typical sites of the species, IRRs for pine, 
spruce, and birch lie between 3 and 5 per cent. Thus, choosing r, e.g. 4 per cent, implies 
that the choice of species should on many soils change towards fast growing species 
like birch and away from the slower growing oak and pine species. Actual 
implementation of such a shift should, however, take into account that changes in 
supply in the long run, brought about by changes in choice of species, will perhaps 
change prices and hence profitability of the different species. Hence, adjustment in 
choice of species should be less dramatic than Figure 4 seems to suggest at first glance. 
The limitation of the applied cost and price data (CFME 1998) is acknowledged as well. 
Furthermore, the previously mentioned effects of risk reduction through a diverse 
species composition should be taken into account, and so should the production of 
valuable externalities, a point to which we return below. Finally, the cash value of, e.g. 
a normal oak forest is much higher than that of a normal birch forest – also implying a 
higher potential for, e.g. optimal income smoothing. 
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Table 1. Comparison of current minimum allowable rotation ages in commercial forests 
and optimal timber rotations on typical sites. 
Tree species  Minimum  Optimal rotations 
  Allowable 
Rotation age 
Forest 
rent 
SEV, 2% SEV, 3% SEV, 4%  SEV, 5%
Pine  101  80  65 60 55 50 
Spruce  81  75  65 65 60 55 
Oak  121  95  75 70 70 65 
Ash  101  90  70 65 60 60 
Birch  61  70  55 55 55 50 
Black  Alder  61  75  60 55 55 50 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the effect of r on rotation ages in Lithuanian forestry in case the 
Faustmann criterion is applied. Discounting with rates from 2 to 5 per cent would not 
radically change rotation ages for fast growing tree species such as birch and black 
alder. The contrary result is obtained for slower growing broadleaves and conifers, 
covering more than 60 per cent of the forest land. An r as low as 2 per cent results in a 
decrease in optimal rotation ages of 15 years for spruce and up to 45 years for oak. 
 
Figure 5. Standing volume in mature forests. 
Note: MARA – minimum allowable rotation age. 
 
Figure 6. Liquidation value of mature forests. 
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3.2 The political dilemma 
Values accumulated in Lithuanian forests are remarkable in the scale of the present 
economy. If an r of 2 per cent is chosen, the value of mature forests makes up about 35 
per cent of the Lithuanian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which amounted to US$ 
10.73 billion in 1998. If, say, two thirds of this capital is released during the next 10 
years, it could annually increase the GDP by 2-3 per cent directly. Add to this the 
multiplier effect of reallocating the capital tied up in old forest stands to more 
productive uses. Despite the roughness of the estimation, the potential of boosting the 
transition economy is apparent. To further stress the need for careful consideration of 
future harvest policy, it can be noted that current annual Lithuanian harvest levels 
amount to approximately 5 million m
3, less than half the annual increment of 
approximately 12 million m
3. Thus, capital build-up in roundwood is continuing at an 
impressive pace.  
Lithuania and many other East European countries still suffer from the aftermath of the 
USSR and its collapse. The economies are rather weak and there is a profound shortage 
of capital for investment in projects, which can help Lithuania and other East European 
countries meet their high aims for growth in GDP. There is no doubt that the future 
generations of the East European nations will be richer than the current ones. Following 
the arguments of Pearce and Turner (1990) this implies that social discount rates should 
be higher than the simple time preference, putting an upward pressure on the r in 
forestry. Thus, the people and politicians of Lithuania and the other East European 
countries should be aware of the choice they face: Insisting on the current restrictive 
rules for rotation ages and harvest patterns implies that less hospitals, roads, 
infrastructure and schools can be built. On the other hand, softening the restrictive rules 
and increasing harvests implies a reduction in the production of externalities such as 
recreation values. 
Hartmann (1976) showed that in the presence of externalities rotation ages should 
perhaps be higher than otherwise. The implicit assumption is that forest stands produce 
positive values other than roundwood, often non-market values, and that this production 
increases with stand age. There is a general consensus that this is indeed correct. 
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However, so far little attention has been given to the question of substitution between 
stands. It is reasonable to assume that, as the amount of old stands increases, the 
marginal value of the benefits supplied decreases. The following revised Faustmann 
model takes this into account. 
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Here  J(T) is the net present value of the i’th single stand, including the value of 
externalities as expressed in the function g(). C is regeneration costs, t is stand age and 
time, T∈]0;Tmax] is the rotation age, A() is the area within each age class at the different 
time points and V(T) is the value of the timber stock. The first-order condition for 
maximum of J(T) becomes: 
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Note, that this condition must be solved simultaneously for all stands in the area 
considered. Typically, we expect ∂g/∂t = gt > 0, implying that externality production 
increases with age. This tends to increase the rotation age. However, we will also expect 
that  gA(t’, t) < 0, i.e. as the area of an age class increases, the marginal benefit of 
externalities produced by a stand t decreases. Furthermore, if all age classes have the 
same area it seems reasonable to expect that gA(Tmax, t) < ..< gA(t, t) < .. gA(0, t)< 0. The 
interpretation is that the marginal value of externalities for the stand in focus is affected 
more by (changes in) the area of old stands than (changes in) the area of young stands. 
Thus, having insignificant areas of old forest, the value of externalities from high age 
classes exceeds the financial value of felling forest in these classes, therefore stands 
have to be retained. When increasing the area of old stands, the marginal benefit of 
externalities decreases and the area should not be increased further once the first-order 
condition is fulfilled. In every age class we should stop felling when the equilibrium 
condition is satisfied. While an abstraction like (1) and (2) may represent a convenient 
expression of the problem, the crucial issue: determining g(), remains unsolved. 
However, formulating the problem as in (1) and (2) helps in putting focus on the true 
problem. While advocates of low discount rates often point towards the correlation of 
externality production with stand age, they seem to forget that the value of externalities 
is not independent of supply. Using low (or even zero) discount rates in a classical 
Faustmann formulation is likely to lead to inefficiency and excess supply of 
externalities. Inefficiency is also a likely outcome of using high discount rates in 
Faustmann calculations, as a shortage of externalities will result. 
(2) 
(1)    
Relying on these observations, we suggest a redefinition of the classical theory of the 
normal forest, still honoured in East Europe. Along with the ideas embedded in 
equations (1) and (2) above, decision makers could pursue a (normal) forest structure 
using a financially rational r, while still maintaining sufficiently large areas of old 
forests to ensure a socially optimal production of timber and externalities (Figure 7). 
Such an ideal distribution of age classes could be called a “sustainable normal forest”.  
4. Financial versus socio-economic considerations  
Forests in central planning economies have for decades been managed according to 
strict regulations, which did not allow much flexibility when making important 
silvicultural decisions, e.g. choosing the length of rotation. Lack of managers’ 
experience as to forming their own perception of time preference in forest investments 
and absence of historical data on financial markets greatly restrain the justification of an 
appropriate r in the conventional manner. However, examination of impacts of various 
rs allows envisioning consequences of discounting.  
The analysis in the previous section indicates possible outcomes for Lithuanian forestry, 
which can with some degree of confidence be extended to parts of surrounding 
countries: Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Bellorussia, and probably to the European part of 
Russia, at least at the “Baltic” latitudes. This becomes possible due to similar traditions 
of silvicultural practices (with some deviations in Russia), convergence of timber prices 
in the established international free market (Thorsen 1998), similar structure of 
silvicultural costs, etc. Firstly, it is interesting to examine the outcomes of the choice of 
r from a rational and purely financial viewpoint. 
Figure 7. Sustainable normal forest versus the classical normal forest and the actual age 
structure of pine in Lithuania. All normalised to 100 hectares. 
Note: Age class refers to the upper end of a decade, e.g. age class 10 represents stands of age 0 to 10. 
 
The adoption of rs above 5 per cent would make forestry an unprofitable venture in the 
region east of the Baltic Sea. If political constraints were in such case replaced by pure 
financial optimisation, the rational outcome would be clearing of all stands older than 
60 years and abandoning the bare land or, in the best case, converting it into agriculture. 
The latter outcome is hardly possible at the current stage of extensive agriculture.  
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Since calculations for all species and productivity classes yield an average IRR of 
approximately 4.3 per cent, the “r a little less than IRR” rule would imply an r of about 
3.5 per cent. As shown earlier, an r of 3-4 per cent implies conversion of forests towards 
fast growing broadleaves. It would justify past and present forestry practices in the 
European part of Russia where coniferous forests have been over-harvested and large 
areas regenerated with fast growing soft broadleaves of low economic value (Nilsson 
and Shvidenko 1998). An r between 0 and 3 per cent would most likely justify the 
continuous management of coniferous species. The shift towards lower rotations would 
be an obvious outcome, in particular in the upper half of this range of r.  
As discussed above it can be argued that capital tied up in State forests could be used 
for other, investments: schools, hospitals, environmental protection, energy-producing 
facilities or simply buying other real or financial, foreign or national assets. However, 
adopting a high r does not imply that a swift increase in harvest levels is optimal. This 
would most likely lead to a sudden decrease in timber price due to local excess supply. 
The timber market may approach the steady state in the long run (Brazee and 
Mendelsohn 1990, Thorsen 1998), but not all paths towards this state are optimal. Even 
with a high r, changes in harvest policies must take into account market reactions.  
The above considerations largely rely on the rationality of a “profit maximiser”. Such a 
purely financial approach hardly could be expected to be followed in public decision 
making in East European forestry. The common trend in contemporary forestry is an 
increasing weight on environmental forest benefits, yet these benefits are difficult to 
value in monetary terms, which is needed to estimate the best ways to increase the 
social welfare (Helles 2000). Under such circumstances, the decisions on use of forest 
resources increasingly become a subject addressed by politicians and economic 
considerations are often neglected.  
In addition, we should not exclude institutional settings and public response to proposed 
actions. It is quite obvious that, say, a twofold or threefold increase in the amount of 
clear fellings would require a radical reallocation of financial and managerial resources 
in East European forestry agencies. As March and Olsen (1989) indicate, institutions 
embed historical experience into rules, routines, and forms that persist beyond the 
historical moment and conditions. This notion is highly relevant in our case. Such 
concepts as “maximisation of the increment of the most valuable assortments” are 
deeply entrenched in the thinking of East European forest managers. Simultaneously, 
public opposition to a sudden increase of fellings is easily predictable, only the exact 
consequences of the counteraction are unclear. Another Lithuanian example might serve 
to show the attitudes of parts of the public. Due to heavy windthrows and subsequent 
insect damage, the annual cut of timber in 1995 and 1996 was increased to almost 6 
million m
3 from the usual 3-4 million m
3. Despite the fact that 6 million m
3 lies far 
below the total annual increment (12 million m
3), foresters were rewarded with epithets 
such as “an army of fellers” and “destroyers of Lithuanian forests” (Aleknonis and 
Jackoniene 1998). The professional self-understanding of Lithuanian foresters still 
suffers from this image and they are, therefore, likely to be reluctant to suggestions of 
increased harvesting levels. 
High preferences for old forests might be the expression of considerable option and 
bequest values, but it is also related to direct use values. Cardinal non-monetary 
evaluations show that mature stands (according to current minimum allowable rotation 
age) of slow growing broadleaves and conifers have the highest recreational value    
(Riepšas 1990), while premature stands of these species contain the highest summed 
protection value (Pauliukevičius and Kenstavičius 1995). The favouring of old forest is 
also dependent on the cultural-ethical values established in consciousness or even in 
sub-consciousness of humans. For example, an association of the word “forest” with the 
old sacred oak might seem an irrational argument, but it could be a partial explanation 
of the conservative standpoint of parts of Lithuanian Society whose world view, 
according to ethnologists, still includes features of the heathenish religion (Hauptmann 
1980). 
However, the application of any r from even a purely financial standpoint does not 
mean that identical financial rotation ages have to be applied in all forests. In fact, this is 
already excluded in Lithuania, where severe harvesting restrictions are imposed on 14.6 
per cent of the total forest area. These restrictions reflect attempts to catch the positive 
externalities from forests, such as shelter for endangered species. Even if unable to 
exactly evaluate the production of positive externalities, policy makers need to 
somehow take them into account when designing forest policy. 
Such attempts fit well into the above defined ideal age classes distribution called 
sustainable normal forest (Figure 7). It is emphasised that the imagined ideal 
distribution should not be a static conception. The area of older age classes were 
increased over time along with the increasing positive social preferences to 
environmental benefits from forests. The corresponding changes were easier 
accommodated if the actual age structure would shift towards the sustainable normal 
forest instead of being transformed into the classical normal forest with subjectively 
chosen rotation ages.  
5. Implications for Lithuanian forestry 
The above considerations prove the difficulty associated with the choice of discount rate 
in forestry of transition economies. On the one hand, transition to the market economy 
and adoption of modern methods of forest economics require that the choice is made 
and the magnitude of the discount rate affects the results of economic analysis in 
forestry. On the other hand, economic considerations are often overshadowed by 
subjective valuations, especially in the arena of public forest policy. Monetary 
evaluations of the positive externalities from forests are extremely uncertain in the 
present dynamic socio-economic and cultural-ethical context. The presented model 
(formulas 1 and 2) and proposed ideal age class distribution called “sustainable normal 
forest” (Figure 7) suggest a way in which an economically rational approach still may 
be applied as an integral part of the decision making in forestry.  
As the externality value, the g-function in (1) and (2), is unknown we too suggest a 
fairly low r for State forestry in order to catch substantial amounts of the age dependent 
externality production. Hence, we suggest an r of less than or equal to 2 per cent for 
contemporary economic evaluations in East European State forestry. In some cases, 
application of the forest rent instead of SEV may be appropriate. It is noted that policy 
may establish additional constraints, e.g. on sustainability of production in both cases. 
Also, it is strongly emphasised not to ignore the values of non-timber and non-market 
outputs from forestry such as recreation, landscape, biological, historical, cultural, and 
environmental values. The r should be viewed as one among a number of decision 
parameters.     
Compared to public decision making, private forest landowners usually put a larger 
weight on the maximisation of profits. In this case, the real interest rate, reflecting an 
opportunity cost of capital, might be a more suitable approach. We do not have the luck 
of being able to analyse long-term real rs, since such data are absent in East European 
countries. Our advice would be to look at Scandinavian countries: growth conditions are 
similar, and in the long term economic development is also likely to be similar. Forestry 
practices reveal that private investors apply rs from 0 to 4 per cent in Scandinavian 
forestry. The “r a little less than IRR” rule is not violated in this range either. 
Furthermore, the need for development of forest legislation is hereby underlined, with 
the purpose to achieve fulfilment of social targets also in the private sector. The above 
arguments for choosing an r for State forestry partially apply to private forestry too. As 
a compromise, we suggest using an r of 2 per cent. Country and project specifics may 
require shifting this rate downward to 0 per cent or upward to 4 per cent, but it could 
serve as a reference point for investment analyses for private forests in Eastern Europe. 
An interesting subject for future research is the evaluation of possible paths toward 
sustainable normal forests in Lithuania, providing the greatest benefits for Society. The 
estimation of the optimal level of externalities probably would be the most challenging 
part of such research. Despite all the uncertainties it is beforehand obvious that a careful 
choice of r, in combination with environmentally balanced legislation, will be an 
important agent for sustainable development in East European forestry. 
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